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Conflict theory represents a useful perspective in the conceptualization of welfare policy. 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1971) theorized that government distributes 
financial assistance (e.g., welfare) in response to conflict (e.g., rioting by the poor masses). Thus, 
welfare is a mechanism of control used in an effort to squelch rebellious poor people’s 
movements. The goal of this paper is to analyze the validity of Piven and Cloward’s thesis 
through a review of empirical literature that supports and challenges this thesis. Conflict theory 
will be utilized in a discussion of how it may inform further research in the field of welfare 
policy.     
Conflict Theory: Concepts, Principles, & Assumptions 
 Conflict theory seeks to explain the emergence of conflict, its varying forms, and its 
consequences (Allan, 2007; Strandbakken, 1996). The theory envisions power as the central 
feature of society presupposing that a conflict of interest arises between individuals and social 
groups. Lewis Coser, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Randall Collins are particularly useful when 
conceptualizing conflict theory.  
Lewis Coser contended that the need for conflict is instinctually embedded in the human 
psyche and is a functional aspect of humans’ daily lives (Allan, 2007; Coser, 1956). The 
inequitable distribution of scare resources (e.g., wealth, power, and prestige) may represent the 
catalyst for conflict (Allan, 2007; Bartos & Wehr, 2002). Building on Coser’s belief that conflict 
is instinctual, Ralf Dahrendorf contended that conflict is ever-present in all interactions and is the 
foundation for all social change (Allan, 2007; Schellenberg, 1982). Contrary to Karl Marx, 
Dahrendorf believed that class extends beyond economic resources to authority and power in 
general. Power is a key component regarding the definition of societal roles, norms, and values 
(Allan, 2007). Those with power hold the ability to define these societal roles, norms, and values. 
Thus, these tenets may be expressed through welfare policy aimed at controlling certain societal 
subgroups. Dahrendorf contended that structure-changing social movements are often gradual 
and not necessarily grounded in class relations (Schellenberg, 1982; Strandbakken, 1996).  
Randall Collins echoed Coser in his assumption that conflict is the result of the 
inequitable distribution of scarce resources, including economic, power, and status or cultural 
resources (Allan, 2007; Collins, 1993). These potential conflicts are actualized with heightened 
emotional, moral, and symbolic mobilization resulting in group solidarity. Conflict breeds 
subsequent conflict and countermobilization. The threat of countermobilization lends to 
heightened group solidarity and strengthened feelings of group membership.  
Utility of Conflict Theory as Applied to Welfare Policy 
 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1971) provided a historical context for the 
welfare boom of the 1960s. They contended that increased urbanization of poor African 
Americans to the North coupled with lack of employment opportunities led to relative 
deprivation and urban riots. In an effort to extinguish rioting and appease the unemployed, 
political leaders chose to widen social assistance eligibility requirements. The belief is that 
increased conflict (i.e., rioting of the poor) leads to increased government interventions intended 
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to decrease the level of conflict. In times of low conflict, social assistance levels decrease to 
expand the low-wage labor supply. To test the utility of Piven and Cloward’s thesis, it is 
beneficial to examine the welfare rolls in concert with historical context to determine whether 
welfare rolls increased in response to heightened conflict. 
Supports 
Literature that supports Piven and Cloward’s thesis would find that welfare rolls increase 
as a result of increased conflict. Subsequently, conflict would decrease due to heightened welfare 
enrollment. The research of Betz (1974), Isaac and Kelly (1981), and Schram and Turbett (1983) 
supported this theory’s utility, while the research of Hicks and Swank (1983) showed mixed 
support for this theory’s utility. 
 Betz (1974) studied the 43 largest cities in the United States to determine whether or not 
riots and government response (i.e., welfare) were correlated. Betz (1974) examined the 
percentage change of welfare expenditures for 23 major riot cities versus 20 minor or non-riot 
cities during the period of 1960 to 1969. He found that, on average, government expenditures 
increased by 6.2 percent in major riot cities and increased by 3.3 percent in minor or non-riot 
cities during this time period. Among the 16 cities that experienced riots in 1967, welfare 
expenditures increased at a rate of 57 percent from 1967 to 1968; whereas, welfare expenditures 
decreased by .3 percent for the control group during this same period. This evidence lends 
credence to Piven and Cloward’s thesis. 
 Isaac and Kelly (1981) predicted that racial conflict severity would have a greater impact 
on welfare case rolls than conflict frequency. Further, they hypothesized that the federal 
government would respond at a greater rate than state or local governments. The researchers 
concluded that racially-focused rioting heavily influenced the expansion of welfare expenditures 
in the short-term, which supports Piven and Cloward’s thesis. Additionally, riot frequency was 
found to have a greater impact on welfare case rolls than riot severity. 
 Schram and Turbett (1983) contended that civil conflict results in increased welfare 
assistance, which results in high implementation rates by high-conflict state governments. They 
found that conflict severity was a greater predictor of welfare growth than conflict frequency. 
Their research found that states, rather than cities, had the capacity to liberalize Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) requirements resulting in welfare as a method of social 
control. 
 Hicks and Swank (1983) hypothesized that urban riots were resolved by Community 
Action Agency activities that increased awareness of AFDC benefits and subsequent AFDC 
enrollment. The researchers found mixed support for Piven and Cloward’s thesis holding that 
need, apart from conflict, generates caseload growth. Further, Piven and Cloward’s thesis that 
welfare assistance and social conflict are related was strongly supported by Hicks and Swank 
(1983).  
Challenges 
Literature that challenges Piven and Cloward’s thesis would find evidence contrary to the 
belief that welfare rolls are increased to decrease conflict. The research of Albritton (1979), 
Jennings (1983), as well as Chamlin, Burek, and Cochran (2007) do just that.
 Albritton (1979) examined Piven and Cloward’s thesis and the plausibility for alternative 
explanations for the association of conflict and caseload. The researcher examined possible 
relationships between “social disorders” (e.g., riots and crime) and welfare caseloads as well as 
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“social disorders” and increases in populations consisting of people of color. The researcher 
found no significant relationships between the aforementioned variables. Thus, Albritton (1979) 
contended that extraneous variables or chance alone may explain the association. 
Jennings (1983) challenged Isaac and Kelly’s (1981) two hypotheses, which are stated 
above. The researcher found that the Isaac and Kelly (1981) study measures lacked reliability, 
and that the study contained inconsistent variables. Jennings (1983) found that conflict (i.e., 
riots) did result in higher benefit levels; however, the level of need was found to be heavily 
associated with public assistance. Additionally, the researcher demonstrated that welfare gains 
did not diminish as conflict decreased.  
Chamlin, Burek, and Cochran (2007) hypothesized that the transition from AFDC to 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) should result in two outcomes: (1) Increased 
labor supply above ongoing social processes and (2) Decreased welfare population size. The 
researchers found that the switch from AFDC to TANF had no effect on Wisconsin’s labor 
supply, but that it briefly resulted in decreased welfare caseload. Moreover, the welfare caseload 
actually increased to pre-intervention levels six months after the introduction of TANF. Thus, 
these findings stand counter to Piven and Cloward’s contention that government officials 
manipulate welfare policy to control the labor supply.   
Informing Research in Welfare Policy 
Conflict theory is useful in informing welfare policy research. As described above, 
conflict theory informed Piven and Cloward’s (1971) thesis that government programs (i.e., 
welfare) are implemented to squelch conflict of the lower-classes. Only one article was found 
that explores this theory post-TANF. Research is needed that explores a correlation between 
level of conflict and TANF caseload. If Piven and Cloward are correct, then the decrease in 
welfare caseload combined with low-paying employment for welfare leavers would result in 
heightened conflict. Additionally, government officials would expand the welfare rolls to 
extinguish this heightened conflict.  
Research is needed that examines the degree to which these government programs 
actually exacerbate social conflict. Therefore, research is needed that explores the degree to 
which conflict resonates around entitlement versus means-tested social programs. Research may 
explore the degree to which social welfare programs actually separate the lower and working 
classes. Conflict may arise between those that are poor and qualify for social welfare and those 
that are poor and do not qualify. Research could explore this divisiveness between subgroups and 
how this divisiveness impacts group solidarity and mass mobilization. 
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